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KENTUCKY LAWV JOURNAL
EQUITY:

UNFAIR COMPETITION; PROTECTION OF
CORPORATE NAME
The Churchill Downs Distilling Company was organized to engage
in the whisky business. No one connected with the company had the
name of Churchill or Downs, but the organizers adopted this name.
It labeled the whisky that it produced, "Churchill Downs Brand,
Straight Kentucky Bourbon Whisky, Bottled by Churchill Downs Distilling Co., Inc., Louisville, Kentucky." The name "Churchill Downs"
was printed in bold letters on the labels put on the bottles, and there
was a large facsimile of a grandstand easily identified as the one at
the Churchill Downs race track. In front of this grandstand horses
were running on the track. The plaintiff, Churchill Downs, Inc.,
brought this action to enjoin the defendant from further use of the
name Churchill Downs on its products and as its business name. The
plaintiff is the owner and operator of the Churchill Downs race track,
which is famous for the Kentucky Derby that is run on that track
every spring. Held: Injunction granted.'
Where two persons or business firms were engaged in the same
business or in marketing the same product, and one of the two attempted to take over and use the name of the other, in order to take
advantage of the reputation that the other had built up for the name,
the courts quickly recognized the wrong and gave relief against this
unfair practice which was termed unfair competition. In the case
of McLean v. Fleming,2 defendant was enjoined from the use of a
label similar to one used on certain pills of the plaintiff, where the
names were similar, as were the products. In order to be entitled to
relief it was necessary that the original user have a right to the
name, gained by his exclusive use thereof, and that by that use he had
given the name a secondary meaning connected with his business or
product.
From this use of the term unfair competition many courts were
misled into holding that no relief should be given unless the parties
were engaged in actual market competition. In the case of Borden
Ice Cream Co., et al., v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co.3 the court refused to enjoin the Borden Ice Cream Co. from the use of the "Borden"
because the two companies were not engaged in any actual market
competition in the same product. It was said that no relief could be
given under the term "unfair competition" unless the two parties made
the same products or were in the same business, and unless the purpose in using the name was to get the same trade from the same
'Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky.
567, 90 S. W. (2d) 1041 (1936). It will be noted that the injunction
that the court granted was very broad and enjoined the defendant
from further use of the name Churchill in connection with the name
Downs, and after the present stock on hand already labeled was used
up, to cease to sell its products under this name.
296 U. S. 245 (1877).
3 201 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).

STUDENT NOTES
people. Several cases have followed this principle and required that
for relief in this sort of case there must be actual market competition.4
Some courts, however, have recognized that the injury to the
plaintiff in a case of unfair competition might be just as real and
just as apparent even though the two companies were not engaged in
the same business and marketing the same product. = In Wall v. RollsRoyce of America5 the plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture of
autos and aeroplanes and the defendant made radio tubes and labeled
them with the name used by the plaintiff. The court granted the injunction saying that the use of the name might confuse the public and
cause them to think that the defendant was a subsidiary of the plaintiff and in so doing it would be engaging in unfair competition. These
cases bear out the contention that the reputation of a company depends upon all the products sold under the name of the corporation.
The Kentucky court seems to have been one of the first to recognize an injury to the original user of a name even though the parties
were not engaged in actual market competition. In the case of Armstrong v. Kleinhans & Sinonson7 an injunction was granted to the
plaintiff to restrain the defendant from the use of a name in conection with his business when the plaintiff had given the name a secondary meaning connected with a building that he owned.
In the present case the plaintiff made no allegation or proof that
the whisky made by the Churchill Downs Distilling Co. was of an
Inferior nature and that plaintiff's reputation would suffer thereby.
Nor was it contended that the plaintiff's reputation would suffer by
reason of its name being connected with the liquor business.8 It was
shown "that the public had not been induced to buy the goods of the
Churchill Downs Distilling Company under the belief that they were
IRegent Show Mfg. Co. v. Haaker, 74 Neb. 426, 106 N. W. 595,
4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 447 (1906); National Grocery Co. v. National Stores
Corp., 95 N. J. Eq. 538, 123 A. 740 (1924); Blue Goose Auto Service v.
Blue Goose Super Service Station, 110 N. J. Eq. 43S, 160 A. S36 (1932);
Beech-Nut Packing Co.-v. P. Lorrilard Co. 7 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1925), affirming 299 Fed. 834 (D. C. N. F. 1924); Bortwith v. Evening
Post, 37 Ch. D. 449 (188); Carroll, et al. v. Duluth Milling Co., 232
F. 675 (C. C. A. Sth, 1916); Pittsburg Brewing Co. v. Ruben 3 F. (2d)
342 (App. D. C. 1925).
Standard Oil Co. of New lexico, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 56 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932); Colorado Natl. Co. v.
Colorado Natl. Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 386, 36 P. (2d) 454 (1934);
Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dunmore Co. 35 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 6th,
1929); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924); Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1925).
434 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925).
71 Ky. Law Rep. 112 (1880).
For a case holding that such an allegation alone would be insuf
flcient to grant an injunction on, see Edison v. Thomas A. Edison, Jr.
Chemical Co., 12S Fed. 957 (C. C. D. Del., 1904).
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manufactured by Churchill Downs, Inc."' The only mention of anything that approached an injury to substance was a slight inconvenience in the mixing of the mail and freight of the two companies. In
view of these facts this case must stand for the proposition that a
name is to be protected as a name, and that it is not necessary to
show an injury to substance.
ANDREW CLARK.

THE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO REVOKE A CALL FOR AN
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The governor of this state does not have the power to adjourn
the legislature where it has convened and organized, except in certain
emergencies as provided for by the constitution.' Nor has the legislature the power to convene itself in extraordinary session in the
2
absence of a constitutional provision to that effect.
The power of the governor to revoke a call for a special session
of the legislature previous to the organization of such session is a
more complicated question and has only been adjudicated twice in the
United States.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of People v. Parker,
in construing a constitutional provision4 vesting in the governor the
power to call an extraordinary session of the legislature, held in a
two-to-one opinion that the governor could revoke such call in his discretion, prior to the meeting and organization of the legislature. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case of Royster, Clerk v. Brock,'
by a four-to-three opinion reached just the opposite result in construing a constitutional provision 6 similar to that the Nebraska Court had
under consideration.
The constitutions of both Nebraska and Kentucky specifically vest
in the governor the power of convening an extraordinary session of
the general assembly. Neither constitution specifically provides for
the revocation of such call. The Nebraska Court finds that the chief
executive, having the authorized power to convene the general assembly, has the implied power to revoke such call. The Kentucky Court
finds that no such implied power exists. The majority opinion in the
Nebraska Court and the minority opinion in the Kentucky Court indicate that the fact that the governor is constituted chief executive of
the State should have some weight in determining whether such
power could be exercised. The majority of the Kentucky Court, on the
"Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky.
567 at 575, 90 S. W. (2d) 1041 at 1045 (1936).
'Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S. W. 177.
263 P. 635, 56 A. L. R. 706.
'People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634.
Neb. Const., Sec. 9.
258 Ky. 146, 79 S. W. (2d) 707.
'Ky. Const., Sec. 80.

